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TRADE CRED~: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
In addition to borrowing from financial institutions, firms may be financed by their
suppliers. Although there are many theories explaining why non-financial firms lend money,
there are few comprehensive empirical tests of these theories. This paper attempts to fill the gap.
We focus on a sample of small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited. We find
evidence that firms use trade credit relatively more when credit from financial institutions is not
available, Thus while short term trade credit may be routinely used to minimize transactions
costs, medium term borrowing against trade credit is a form of financing of last resort. Suppliers
lend to firms no one else lends to because they may have a comparative advantage in getting
information about buyers cheaply, they have a better ability to liquidate goods, and they have a
greater implicit equity stake in the firm’s long term survival. We find some evidence consistent
with the use of trade credit as a means of price discrimination. Finally, we find that firms with
better access to credit from financial institutions offer more trade credit. This suggests that firms
may intermediate between institutional creditors and other firms who have limited access to
financial institutions.
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and NBERTrade credit is the singlemost importantsource of short term external finance for fums in the United
States.2Why do industrialfirms extendtrade credit when more specialized financial institutions such as banks
could provide finance? There are many theoretical explanations fornade credit: Trade credit may provide
acrossto capiti for fms thatare unableto raise itthrough more traditional channels. Suppliers may be better
thanspecializedfinancial institutions in evaluating and controlling the credit risk of their buyers. If so, trade
credit may be a way for f~ms with better access to credit markets to intermediate finance to fwms with less
accessto creditmarkets. Alternatively,madecredh may allowsuppliersto price discriminate using credit when
discriminationdirectlythroughprices is notlegallypermissible. Fina!ly trade credit may be useful in reducing
transactionscostsor inprovidingassurances about the quality of the supplier’s products. Unfortunately, there
is very little systematic evidence about why trade credit is extended or which f~ms are the largest providers
or users of trade credit. In this paper, we shed some light on these issues.
The problem in testing theories of trade credit thus far has been the paucity of data. Databases like
Compustat do not have the detail needed to test the nuances of the various theories that serve to distinguish
them. In this paper, we use a more detailed database compiled by the National Survey of Small Business
Finance (NSSBF). This data set focuses on small fums, which are more likely to face constraints on their
ability to raise capital.
We fmd thatsuppliers appear to have some advantage in financing growing firms, especially if their
creditqualityis suspect.We conjecturethreepotentialreasonsfor this. First, the evidence suggests these fums
may be a sourceof futurebusiness,and suppliersare more willingtoprovide credit in anticipation of capturing
this business. Second, suppliers may obtain the information they need at low cost from product market
transactions, and perhaps from other suppliers. The information that suppliers use in monitoring and
controllingrepaymentseemstobe differentfrom thatusedby financial institutions, perhaps because the nature
of the credit is very different. Thkd, suppliers appear to rely on their ability to repossess and sell the goods
against which credit has been granted.
The rest of thepaper is orgtied as follows. In section 1, we flesh out the empirical implications of
2Rajan and Zingales (1993) report that accounts payable amounted to 15% of the assets for a sample of
non-financial U.S. firms on Global Vantage while debt in current liabilities accounted for just 7.4%.
1whatwe believeare themost important theoretical explanations of trade credit. In section II, we describe the
data. SectionIIIexaminesthe determinants of trade credit granted by a firm, while section IV examines who
receives credit. We conclude with a discussion of the results and suggestions for future research.
I. Trade Credit: Theories,
We start witha brief description of the theories that have been proposed to explain the existence and
use of trade credit. This listis notmeantto be comprehensive.Rather, it reflects what we believe are the more
plausible theories in the literature and the ones upon which our data can shed light,
A. Financing advantage theories of trade credit.
The suppliermay have an advantage over traditional lenders in investigating the credit worthiness of
his clients, as well as a better ability to monitor and force repayment of the credit. This may give him a cost
advantageover financialinstitutionsin offering credit to a buyer (see Schwartz (1974) for an early exposition
of the financing advantage theory of trade credit). There are at least three sources of cost advantage.
1. Advantage in information acquisition.
The suppliermay visitthebuyer’spremisesmore often than financial institutions would. The size and
timing of the buyer’s orders also give him an idea of the condition of the buyer’s business. The buyer’s
inability to take advantage of early payment discounts may serve as a tripwire to alert the supplier of a
deteriorationinthe buyer’screditworthiness.3 Whilefinancial institutions may also collect similar information,
the supplier may be able to get it faster and at lower cost because it is obtained in the normal course of
business.
2. Advantage in controlling the b~er.
It may be in the mture of the goodsbeing supplied that there are few economical altermtive sources
other than the supplier. If so, the supplier can threaten to cut off future supplies in the event of borrower
actionsthatreducethe chancesof repayment. This threat may be especially credible if the buyer accounts for
a smallportion of the supplier’s sales. By contrast, a funcial institution may have more limited powers; the
threatto withdrawfiture financemay havelittleimmediate effect on the borrower’s operations. Furthermore,
3Theories of trade credit based on the seller having superior information to financial institutions, or the
seller using trade credit terms to sort buyers include Brennan, Maksirnovic and Zechner (1988),
Smith (1987), Biais, Gollier, and Viala (1993).
2the fimncial institution’s ability to withdraw past fmnce may be constrained by bankruptcy laws,
3. Advantage in salvaging valuefrom existing assets.
If the buyer defaults, the supplier can seize the goods that are supplied. The more durable the goods
supplied, the better collateral they provide and the greater the credit the supplier can provide (see Mian and
Smith (1992)). Financial institutions can also reclaim the f~m’s assets to pay off the firm’s loan. However,
if the supplieralreadyhas a networkfor sellingits goods, itscostsof repossessing and resale will be lower than
that of an institution. The advantage of suppliers over fmncial institutions will vary cross sectionally
de~nding upon thetype of goodsthe supplieris sellingandhow much the customer transforms them. The less
the goods are transformed by the buyer the greater the advantage the supplier will have over financial
institutions in finding an alternative buyer.4
B. Price discrimi~tion through trade credit.
Trade credit may be offered even if the supplier does not have a funcing advantage over financial
institutionsbecause credit may be used to price discriminate.5Since credit terms are usually invariant to the
creditqualityof the buyer, tradecreditreducesthe effectiveprice to low quality borrowers. bIf this is the most
price elasticsegmentof the market, then trade credit is an effective means of price discrimination. A mtural
reason why this segment’s demand may be more price elastic is because it is typically credit rationed. If so,
trade credit both lowers the effective price of the good and permits this segment to express its demand.
Anotherway of seeingthis is to note that fms with a high margin (between sales and variable costs)
for their product clearly have a strong incentive to make additional sales, but without cutting the price to
existingcustomers.Since their profit on the next unit is higher, they would be willing to incur a positive cost
to sellan additionalunit, so long as itdoes not affect their previous sales. Under the assumption that anti-trust
4Of course, if there are multiple creditors including financial institutions, bankruptcy laws may prevent
a creditorfrom seizing particular goods unless the sale is on consignment, in which case this advantage may
be irrelevant.
5 See Meltzer(1960), Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979), Breman, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988), and
Mian and Smith (1992).
bPetersenand Rajan(1994)fti thatoncethedecisionto grantcredit has been taken, the credit terms seem
to follow industry practice. They are usually not tailored to the particular borrower, Also see Smith (1980).
3lawspreventdirectprice discrimination,highpricedtrade credit may be a subsidy targeted at risky customers,
Creditworthy customers will fmd the trade credit overpriced and repay it as soon as possible. On the other
hand, risky customerswillfti itworthwhileto borrowbecausetradecredit may still be cheaper than the other
sources they have access to.
A relatedversionof thistheory isthat thesupplierdoesnotdiscriminate in favor of the risky customer
solelybecause the customer’s demand is more elastic in the short run. Rather, the supplier may have a long
term interest in the survival of the customer fm. This is especially true if the supplier has no potential
substitutes for the customer. The supplier then factors in not ordy the net profit margin on current sales but
alsothe present value of the profit margins on future sales when deciding whether to help the customer with
credit. In other words, the supplier may want to protect the value of its implicit equity stake in the customer
by providing it temporary short term financing.’
C. Transactions costs theories.
Trade creditmay reducethetransactionscosts of paying bills (Ferris, 1981). Rather than paying bills
every time goods are delivered, a buyer might want to cumulate obligations and pay them only monthly or
quarterly. This will also enable an organization to separate the payment cycle from the delivery schedule.
There are other versions of the transactions cost theory. There may be strong seasonalities in consumption
patternsfor a fum’s products. In order to maintain smooth production cycles, the fm may have to build up
large inventories.This hastwo costs - the costs of warehousing the inventory and the costs of financing it. Of
course, thefum could lower prices in order to effect early sales. But there may be menu costs in doing this,
as well as a loss in discretionary ability. By offering trade credit selectively, both across customers and over
time, the firm may be able to manage its inventory position better.aThe fm can thus reduce warehousing
costs, especially if its customers have a better ability to carry inventory.
II. Data and Econometric Model.
7This argument is conceptually the same as made in Petersen and Rajan (1995). In that model, banks in
monopolistic credit markets were willing to subsidize borrowers with low interest rates since they expected
to reap a return in the future by charging above market rates to the firms which survived.
*See for example the classic Harvard Business School case, Barrington Corporation,
(1987).
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Also see EmeryThe abovetheoriesare hard totest without detailed fm level data. Fortunately, the National Survey
of SmallBusinessFinanceswhich we use contains detailed cross-sectional information on small fwms. While
these firms are much smaller than the typical fm on a database such as Compustat, some of the above
theories are most applicable to small fins. A shortcoming of this survey is that with the exception of sales
figures, all other data are available for only one year. This will limit the scope of our investigation. For
instance, many of the testable implications of the transactions cost hypotheses pertain to the time series. To
the extent that we do not have the data to test these theories, they should be considered part of the null.
A. Sample Description.
The Natioml Survey of SmallBusinessFinances was conducted in 1988-89under the guidance of the
Board of Governorsof the Federal ReserveSystemandthe US SmallBusiness Administration. It targeted non-
financial, non-farm small businesses which were in operation as of December, 1987.9Financial data were
collected only for this fiscal year. The sample was stratified by census region (Northeast, North Central,
South, and West), urban/rural location (whether the firm was located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA)), andby employmentsize (less than 50 employees, 50-100 employees, more than 100 employees and
less than 500 employees (the maximum size in the sample)). The stratification was done to insure that large
and rural firms are represented in the sample. The response rate was seventy to eighty percent, depending
upon the section of the questionnaire considered.10
There are 3404 firms in the sample, of which 1875 are corporations (including S corporations) and
1529are partnershipsor soleproprietorships.Nearly90 percentof these fms are owner managed. 12percent
are majorityownedby women and 7 percent by minorities. Nearly 28 percent of the fwms in our sample are
inthe serviceindustry. These firms are the smallest when measured on the basis of the book value of assets.
Another27 percent of the firms are in the retail trade industry, The largest fms on the basis of book assets
are the manufacturing firms. Twelve percent of our fms are in the manufacturing industry.
One of the virtues of theNSSBFdata isthat it contains details that are not normally available in more
9Firms involvedin the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry; finance and insurance underwriting; or
real estate investment trusts were excluded from the survey.
10Firms were initially sent a series of work sheets which listed the fmncial information which the
questiormaire would collect. The work sheets were followed by a telephone interview.
5commonly used data sets such as Compustat. The data set not ordy includes information from the fwm’s
balancesheetand incomestatement, but it is also a rich source of information on the current financing of the
fm as well as thehistoryof its interactionswithfwial institutions(i.e. length of relationships with financial
institutions and whether the fm applied and was turned down for a loan in the last year), Firms report all
ou~tandingfinancialobligations to financial institutions, non-fimncial fwms, and individuals. Thus we know
whetherthe fm has a mortgage, theunusedportionof its line of credit (assuming it has one), and the interest
rate on the firm’s most recent loan. The data set also reports some information about the type of financial
institutions providing the firm with capital. For example, we know how long the fwm has had a relationship
with the financial institution and the services which the institution provides.
B. Econometric Model.
We will attemptto verify some of the implications of the theories described earlier by examining the
determinants of a firm’s usage of trade credit. In addition to the standard proxies for trade credit usage,
accountsreceivable and accounts payable, the NSSBF data provide us with proxies hitherto unavailable on a
systematic basis. Even so, the lack of detailed data will necessitate some caution in interpreting the results.
When we view the fum as a supplier, its accounts receivable are a proxy for how much it lends its
customers. When we view the firm as a customer, its accounts payable are its borrowing from its supplier.
Thuswe will examineboth setsof trade crdt relationships a fm has, and treat the firms in our data set first
as lenders (suppliers) and then borrowers (customers).
Althoughwe refer to the level of the fwm’s accounts receivable as a proxy for how much it decides
to lend, the level is notdeterminedsolelyby thefm. Rather, it is a combination of the firm’s willingness and
ability to extend credit as well as the ability or desire of its customers to repay the amount when due. The
former could be thought of as the supply of credit by the fum and the latter as the demand for credit by the
customer (See Figure 1). We could therefore specify the trade credit relationship as:
QDmmd forCrti = a~ Pri~r~d~ ~ + ~DDemand factors + ~~
Q supply of credit = aS ‘nmTra& ~ + Ps SUPPIYftiOm + ES
(1)
In this system, the actuallevelof creditand equilibriumprice of credit are determined simultaneously
6There are several problems with estimating this system using standard simultaneous equations techniques.
First, prior research indicatesthat thismarket is nottypicallyclearedby adjustments in price (the interest rate).
Effectiveinterestrates on trade credittypically do not appem to vav witi the credit quality of customers (see
PetersenandRajan (1994)and Smith(19S0)).Rather, the burdenof adjustment seems to fall on whether credit
isgrantedat all, andwhen it is repaid. With the market being cleared by quantity restrictions instead of price
the set of equations can be rewritten in its reduced form so that the quantity of credit depends only upon the
factors which drive the supply of credit offered and the demand for credit by the customer.
QDa~d f., Credit= Qsum~ of Credit
= Ps Supply ftiom + ~~ Demand factom + p (2)
The second difficulty with estimating equation (1) or (2), is we have data on ordy one side of the
Eansaction.The amounta fm lendson its accountsreceivableshodd depend upon the finances and operations
of the firm as well as its customer (see Figure 1). In the absence of data on the fro’s customers, we will
explain this decision ordy with the characteristics of the fum (i.e. the supplier).
Normally, the coefficients on the supply factors will not be consistently estimated when the demand
factorsare excludedfrom theregression, exupt when demand and supply factors are uncorrelated. However,
if thefirm’s customersare generallyshortof other forms of credit, and the price of trade credit does not vary,
the demand for credit would far exceed the fum’s willingness to supply it. Therefore, given credit hungry
customersand a rigidprice, accountsreceivablesis a good measure of credit supplied.11In this case, equation
(2) can be rewritten as:
Q supplyof credit= Ps Supply factors + p
We will use this equation in estimating the credit extended by the fwms in our
accouts receivable(sectionHI).However, sincethis is stilla reducedform equation, and
(3)
sample through their
we cannot be certain
1‘That some customers stretch out repayment is not a problem because, on average, the supplier should
anticipate this. Since accounts receivable represent a supplier’s average experience with customers, we are
on fum ground.
7thatthe lirrn’s customersare largelycredit constrained, caution should be taken when interpreting the results.
The process of estimating the amount of credit taken by our firm is similar, although perhaps more
informative(sectionIw. The level of accounts payable will depend both upon the credit extended to the fum
(supplyeffects)as well as our firm’s demand for funds (demand effects). We still do not have information on
the firm’s suppliers. Even so, givenproxies for the quantity of credit supplied and demanded, we may still be
ableto distinguish demand factors from supply factors. In addition to knowing the f~m’s accounts payables,
we alsoknow the fractionof the firm’s annual purchases that are made on account.12To understand why this
might be a good proxy for the amount of credit offered, we have to consider credit terms in more detail.
Credit terms typicallyquotea discountdate, a duedate, as wellas the amount of discount for payment
by the discountdate. For example, fums in the retail business quote trade credit terms as 2-10 net 30 (Smith
(1987)).Thismeans the customerreceivesa 2 percentdiscount if their bill is paid within 10 days (the discount
date)or theymay pay the full amount by day 30 (the due date). These terms imply an escalating schedule of
penalties.The customergetswhat is effectivelyan interest free loan till the loth day. If the customer does not
pay by the discountdate, but pays on day 30, it is effectivelyborrowing over the next 20 days at an annual rate
of 43.5 percent. If itdoes notpayby thedue date, additioml sanctions may be applied such as eventual cut-off
of supplies. These sanctions could raise the effective interest rate even higher.
Since there is no cost to accepting credit (at least until the discount date), the fraction actually
purchasedon accountis relativelycloseto thefractionthat isoffered on account, which is the amount of credit
voluntarilyofferedby suppliers.Thus when estimating the amount borrowed from suppliers, we will proceed
in two steps. We will fust estimate the fraction of goods offered on credit to the fwm, based on its
characteristics.Theseestimates can then be used to predict the supply of trade credit to the firm. The second
stepisto note that the firm’s accounts payable are a function both of the supply of trade credit and how long
the firm takes to repay the debt. The former is proxied for by the predicted value from the first regression,
whilethe othervariables in the regression control for demand factors. Holding the predicted supply of credit
constant, greater demand for credit will appear as later payment and thus a higher level of accounts payable
by our firm. Whether we are able to distinguish the demand from the supply function is then an empirical
12We also know the fraction of these credit purchases that have discount terms associated with them.
8question which we address below.
C. Data description: me use of trade credit by small and largefirms.
It is instructiveto compare theuse of trade credit by fms in our sample to the use of trade credit by
larger firms inthe much more widelyusedCompustatdataset. We calculate the accounts payable and account
receivableto salesratios by seven broad industry classifications for both our sample of small firms (NSSBF)
and a sampleof large fms (Compustat).To reduce differences induced by time we use Compustat data from
1987. The ratios are reported in Table 1. Small fums uniformly use less trade credit than the large firms.
Firms in the NSSBF have accounts payable equal to only 4.4 percent of their sales whereas for Compustat
fums, accounts payable comprise 11.6 percent of their sales.13
Not only do the smallfwmsborrow less through trade credit, they also extend less trade credit. The
small firm accounts receivable to sales ratio is 7.3 percent versus 18.5 percent for Compustat firms. The
difference in medians is similar (3.8 percent versus 16.1 percent), The greater use of trade credit by larger
fms that is apparent in the aggregate munbers, is also apparent in each of the industries. If small firms are
more capitalconstrainedwe wodd expect them to extend less trade credit (smaller accounts receivables), but
also borrow more through trade credit (have higher accounts payable). However, their desire to borrow
through trade credit may not be matched by suppliers’ willingness to lend. An analysis of which effect
dominatesis best left to the regression analysis. A fml observation from Table 1, is that trade credit is not a
net source of finance for most firms -- large or small. Across the sample, trade credit is a net source of
fmcing for abouta third of the firms. The retail industry is the one exception. In this industry, trade credit
is a net sourceof fundsfor over half thefins. The retail sector’s low level of accounts receivable may be the
result of technological changes that have shortened the time it takes to collect (credit card) receivables, The
growth of credit card usage will shrink the accounts receivables for retail firms. Accounts receivable have
fallen monotonically as a fraction of sales from 9.4 percent in 1970to 8.0 percent in 1980to 7.3 percent in
1987.
‘3These averages are calculated including fums which report zero accounts payable (see Table I). The
fractionof fums with zero accountspayableis also reported in the table. Instead of standardizing by sales, we
couldhave standardizedby costsof goods sold. Using this standardization, small firms still have significantly
lower levelsof accounts payable. Accounts payable are 9.0 percent of cost of goods sold for the small firms
and 18.9 percent of cost of goods sold for the large fwms.
9We now examinethe useof tradecreditby small fms in greater detail, Even in our sample of small
firms, borrowing on, and extension of, trade credit increases with fwm size. Table II a shows the median
accounts receivable to sales ratio when fms are grouped by industry and size. In all industries, the ratio
increaseswith fm size. The medianaccountspayable to sales ratio also rises with firm size across industries
(see Table II b). Thus within the NSSBF sample, and between the NSSBF and Compustat stiple, we fmd
larger firms borrow and extend more trade credit.
The firm’s purchases on account will be used as a measure of the credit it is supplied. We define
annualcreditpurchmes as theproductof cost of goods sold and the fraction of purchases made on credit. We
normalizethis by the valueof assets--becausewe wantto draw a correspondence to leverage which is usually
measured in terms of assets -- and report medians in Table II-c. There appears to be a weak positive
relationshipbetweencreditpurchasesand size, Becauseof the mture of their business, both transportation and
service firms make very few purchases, hence their credit purchases are also small.
III. Who offers credit?
A. me determinants of accounts receivable.
We now test how the level of accounts receivable depends on the characteristic of the supplier. All
theabove theories would predict that firms that are more creditworthy, and have greater observed access to
institutionalcredit should offer more fmnce. The data confirms this in large measure, though there is some
surprising new evidence. The use of trade credit as a means of price discrimination also suggests that the
amount of credit offered should increase in the fwm’s margins. This is supported by the data.
1. me supplier’s access tojiwncing.
In Table IV, we regress the fro’s accountsreceivableto salesratio against proxies for the firm’s own
accessto fnncing, the firm’s characteristics, and its incentive to price discriminate. A summary of the data
is reported in Table III. Since the fum’s ability to extend credit will depend upon its ability to raise funds in
capital markets, we must control for the availability and cost of the firm raising capital. Both firm size and
fum age are proxiesfor the creditworthinessof a firm. Typically, larger firms borrow more even though they
have higher cashflows and fewer growth opportunities. This suggests that they are more creditworthy. The
age of a fum indicates how long it has survived. It is an important proxy, especial]y in this smple, for firm
10qualityand thef~m’s reputationwithpotential lenders.’4Both variables should have a significant influence on
the amount of credit extended by the fwm.
This is indeedthecase (seeTableIV, column I). A fm with $670,000 in assets (the 75th percentile)
extendsan additional3.3 percent more of its sales in the form of accounts receivables as compared to a firm
with$55,000 in assets(the25 percendle).The effect is economically large for the median accounts receivable
to sales ratio is 3,9 percent (see Table III).
Older frms alsoextendmore credit to their customers. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is
smaller. Increasingfirm age from mro to 10years old (the minimum to the median) raises the firm’s accounts
receivables by 1.4 percent of sales. The problem is we have not allowed for sufficient non-linearity in the
relationship.Additionalyears add si@lcantly to a firm’sreputationearly in its life, but have little effect later.
When we includethe square of the log of firm age (see Table IV, column II), both age terms are statistically
significant.AccounE receivable fust increase with age and eventually fall. Accounts receivable peak when a
fm is about 19years of age. Once correctly specified, the effect of age doubles. When a firm matures from
a start-up to a 10 year old firm, the credit it extends through accounts receivable rises by three and a half
percent of its sales. However the decrease in accounts receivable with age is not nearly as dramatic. 15
Whilethe above twovariablesproxy for the fm’s access to exterml financing, we also have data on
themaximum amountthat can be drawn on the firm’s line of credit (if it has one). This is strongly positively
14In addition to being better credit risks themselves, older fwms may also know more about their
customers. In this case, older fm wotid facelessrisk in extending credit to their (long time) customers than
youngerfins. To test this hypothesis, we can separately control for the fm’s age and the firm’s age under
currentmanagement. Ordythe lattervariableis includedin Table IV. A fm’s age under current management
is theempiricallyimportantvariableinpredicdngthe fum’s access to capital (see Petersen and Rajan (1994)).
Thus including the age of the firm can act as a proxy for the maximum amount of time the firm may have
known its customers. Holding the time under current management constant, increasing the age of the firm
lowers the firm’s accounts receivable -- which is inconsistent with this alternative hypothesis.
*5 Anotherexplanationof the eventualdecline in credit offered with firm age is that the oldest fms in our
sample are fundamentally different. Recall that to be in the sample, the fum has to have less than 500
employees. Thus if a firm grew enough, it would not be in our sample. The really old firms are likely to be
an adversely selected sample of old firms. Since they may also have higher costs of credit, sample selection
and thecostof credit is enoughtoexplaintheageeffect. We are careful to ensure that the results we highlight
holdeven whenwe restrict the sample to fums below 10years where the effect of this selection bias is likely
to be small.
11correlated with the amount of accounts receivable that a fm extends (~MmL~~ .f c,cd,[ =0.027, t=4.8).
Interestingly, when we break this amount into the portion that has been drawn down already and the portion
that is as yet untapped (regression not reported), the amount that has already been drawn down has an
estimatedcoefficientof 0.028, whilethe amountthat is unused has an estimated coefficient of 0.017. Thus the
line of credit does appear, in part, to be directly funcing accounts receivable.16
Surprisingly, net income which is a proxy for internal cash generation is negatively correlated with
accountsreceivable (see Table IV, column I). We would expect that f~ms with more internal cash -- higher
profits -- would be able to extend more credit to their customers. Conditioning on the other variables,
however, profitable firms offer less trade credit. We will offer an explanation of this finding shortly.
2. Economic shocks.
Changes in a firm’s sales may indicate shocks to the firm’s operations and help us explain the
coefficient on net profits. We include sales growth multiplied by indicators if positive and negative. Firms
which have had positive sales growth offer slightly more receivables (~= 0.032, t=3.2). The coefficient on
positive sales growth is economically small.
Firms which have seen their sales decline, however, fmd their accounts receivable to sales ratios
increasesignificantly(~= -0.051, t= -6.0). A fwm whose sales drop by thirty percent (the average change for
firms with sales declines), increases its accounts receivable to sales ratio by about three percent of sales.17
Given that accounts receivable is short term credit -- the days receivable outstanding is less than 30 days on
average -- it is urdikely that the downward stickiness is because credit is offered before the collapse in sales
16Analogous to this finding, Calomiris, Hirnmelberg, and Wachtel (1994) find that fiims issuing
commercialpaper alsooffermore trade credit. So fms with access to short term financing offer more short
term credit. We also include accounts payable (as a measure of trade credit borrowing) and the fraction of
purchases made on credit (as a measure of the supply of trade credit). The coefficient estimates are positive
and significant (~P,Y,~l., = 0.056, t= 5.01, ~,ChW, = 0.0002, t= 2.9). The positive coefficients on payables
and creditpurchasesare consistentwiththe ideathatfnms with greater access to fmncing extend more credit.
However, the direction of causality between payables and receivables is debatable.
‘7This does not necessarily imply the level of credit extended increases. Consider a firm whose initial
accountsreceivableto salesratio is 7.3% -- the averagefor fnms in our sample. The regression results predict
that a fall of 30 percent in the firm’s sales is associated with the accounts receivable to sales ratio rising to
8.8%. Therefore, after salesfallby 30percent, accounts receivable are now 0.103 * 0.700 * initial sales, i.e.
6.2% of initial sales. Accounts receivable have fallen, but only 15percent.
12and is notyet due. Rather, firms in trouble may use tie extension of credit to attempt to maintain their sales.
This leadsto a possible explamtion of why profits are negatively correlated with receivables. When we split
profits up into positive profits and losses (Table IV, column (III)), only losses are significantly negatively
correlatedwith accountsreceivable(~= -0.10, t= -4.8). Thus fums making losses tend to extend more credit.
To explorethis further, we separate losses into losses if the fwm has positive sales growth and losses
if the fm has negative sales growth. The coefficient on the former is almost twice as large (~= -0.126, t=-
4.579) as the latter (~= -0.072, t=-2,289). So f~ms that grow fast (and generate losses in the process) seem
to extend more credit and perhaps “buy” sales. But fums in distress (negative sales growth and negative
income) also offer more trade credit. Some of the increase in credit extended by distressed firms may be
involuntary.It is possiblethatdebtors are less willing to repay a distressed fum. Since repayment is enforced
by thethreat of cuttingoff fiture supplies, such threats are less credible when the supplier is distressed. Also,
a distressed firm may be less capable of legal action to recover its dues. The delay in repaying a distressed
firm is a potential cost of financial distress that deserves further study.1s
3. Price discrimination -- trade credit as a strategic tool.
Althoughour focusso far has been on whether a fm has the ability to finance trade credit, our data
allow us to test the price discrimination theory. It predicts that trade credit should be positively related to a
firm’s gross profit margin. The larger a fro’s gross profit margin the greater its incentive to sell -- and if
necessary-- fmnce an additionalunit. We finda positive relationship (see Table IV, column 1)when only the
gross profit margin is included (~= 0.016, t= 2.0). The correct specification is once again non-linear (see
TableIV, column II). Whenthe grossprofitmargin squaredis included,the coefficient on the linear term rises
from 0.016 to 0.060 (t=2.1) while the coefficient on the squared term is -0.043 (t= -1.7). This implies that
accounts receivable increase with gross profit margins until they reach about seventy percent. This is about
the 90’”percentile for gross margins in our sample. The effect is also economically sizeable. An increase in
gross margin from zero to 35 percent (the median) increases accounts receivable by about 1.5 percent of
1sWe also check that all our prior results are not driven ordy by distressed firms. We define a fum to be
distressed if it has negative sales growth and negative net income. Dropping these firms or dummying them
out does not qualitatively affect the coefficient estimates.
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B. Robustness Checks.
At leastpart of thepatternof tradecreditcan be explainedby differences in historical practices across
industries(seeDun and BradStreet1970).To testwhetherour results are simply picking up historical accident,
it is constructive to see whether they survive the inclusion of more detailed industry dummies. In Table IV,
column IV we include 40 2-digit SIC dummies. This is the finest classification of industry contained in our
data. Not surprisingly, the explanatory power of the regressions rises. However the relationships discussed
aboveare qualitativelyunchanged.The economic significance of the gross profit margin is even greater when
we controlfor industry.This is reassuring since gross profit margins differ significantly across industries and
could therefore have proxied for unmeasured industry effects.
We have a large number of wholesalers in the sample, This group is further divided into those who
sell durables and those who sell non-durables. By restricting the regression to this relatively homogeneous
group, we can check if the above results hold within group also. As the estimates in column V suggest, this
is indeed the case.20
We also include an indicator if the fwm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (regression not
reported). A fm in an MSA extends significantly more credit (~= 0.014, t= 3.8). A potential explanation is
thatinstitutiomllendingis lessavailableinthe competitivemetropolitan areas (see Petersen and Rajan (1995)),
and thereforetrade credit substitutesfor it. Alternative y, the kind of information trade creditors obtain is less
valuablein rural areas where everyone knows everybody else’s business. Another possible explanation is that
thepenaltiesa creditorcan exerton latepayers is higher in rural areas, hence credit is repaid more promptly.
19 We have arguedearlierthat fwmswith higher cashflow should be able to extend more credit. The gross
profit margin is not merely a proxy for cashflow. Net income which is included in the regression is a better
proxy. In fact, the correlation between the two is only 0.28.
mThis sub samplealso enables us to test the “quality guarantee” theory. By this we refer to the argument
thattrade creditmay serveas a warran~ for product quality. Firms without reputations in the product market
can attest to the quality of their goods by bearing the cost of fmncing them until such time as the buyer can
ascertain quality for himself (see Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1994) and Smith (1987)), This would imply that
fms withouta goodreputation– i.e. smallerandyounger fums -- offer more credit and that firms producing
durables offer more credit than firms producing perishables. We include an indicator for wholesellers of
durables. The quanti~ of creditofferedby the= merchan~ isboth statistically and economically insignificantly
different from those selling non-durables (~=0.001, t=0.1).
14To summarize, we find evidence suggestirtgthe cost and availability of fmrtce to the supplier is an
importantconsiderationin determining whether credit is extended. This is consistent with any theory of trade
credit. We do, however, fmdthathighergross margins are associated with higher accounts receivable, which
is consistent with the price discrimination theory.
Whatwas notpredictedby any of the prior theoretical discussion is the greater extension of credit by
firms with negative income and negative sales growth. Presumably such fwms have higher costs of raising
finance. If their extension of credit is voluntary, it suggests a different rationale for trade credit than any of
tie theoriesdiscussedso far. One explanation could be window dressing: mamgers of distressed firms make
sales to low credit quality customers in order to keep the numbers up. Another could be that these firms try
(butdo not quitesucceed)in si@ing fuid strength:shong fms offer credit and weakening firms attempt
to imitate them.zl Finally, if the extension is involuntary, it suggests a cost of fimncial distress little
investigated in the literature.
Section IV. Who receives credit?
We now move on to analyze who receives credit from their suppliers and for how long. This will
emble us to better examinethe relevanceof thetinancingadvantagetheory. A fum’s stock of accounts payable
will depend upon both the amount of credit its suppliers offer as well as the firm’s demand for trade credit.
We divideour analysis into two steps. We start by examining how much credit the firm’s suppliers offer the
fm. We conjecturethat a fro’s creditworthinessshouldaffecthow much credit it is offered. But we will also
test if factors that give the supplier a greater advantage in financing the firm influence how much credit it is
offered.
A. Determimnts of who is offered credit :purchures on account.
1. Customer’s credit quli~.
We krtowthe fractionof purckes that each fmmmakes on credit. Since the opportunity to purchase
on creditand borrow interestfree for a fewdaysdominatespaying cash, we expect all firms to borrow during
21Arelated conjecture (we thank David Brown for this) is that fmncially strong fums with deep pockets
settrade credit standards in the industry so that the product-credit package puts financially weaker fums at a
disadvantage.Sucha conjecturebegsthequestion of why the package cannot be unbundled by the other fums
or customers, but suggests interesting avenues for future research.
15the initialperiod.~ Thus the firm’s purchases on account should be an accurate measure of the credit offered
to the fum. Sincewe do not knowwhat fraction of a fum’s cost of goods sold are purchases, we estimate the
fro’s creditpurch~es as the fractionof purchasesmade on credit multiplied by the f~m’s cost of goods sold.
Thisvariableis mismeasuredbecauseinadditiontopurchases,thecost of goods sold includes other items. The
most important of these is likely to be wages.23As the sumey does not report wages separately, we include
employmentscaledby assetsinour regressionsto correctfor the inclusion of wages in our dependent variable.
As canbe seen in Table V, employment is strongly positively correlated with total credit purchases, Having
controlledfor wages, the remaining variation in the dependent variable should capture the variation in credit
purchases from suppliers which is what we are trying to explain.
The firm’s creditqualitymay be especiallyimportant in determining whether it is offered credit. The
explicit price of trade credit does not appear to vary with the customer’s credit quality -- customers in an
industryget standardiradecreditterms (seeSmith(1987)). If suppliers do not use prices -- they do not charge
lowerqualityborrowers a higherexplicitprice -- thenthey must use quantity restrictions. We therefore expect
higher quality firms to be offered more credit. This is indeed the case. Firms of observably higher credit
quality-- as measuredby variablessuchas sizeandprofitability -- receive significantly more credit from their
suppliers (see Table V, column I). This effect survives the inclusion of two-digit SIC indicators (Table V,
column II).
We have identified at least three aspects of the financing advantage theory: the supplier has better
information than financial institutions, the supplier has better conrol, and the supplier has a better ability to
liquidate goods. We can test for each of these aspects.
2. Relationships withfinuncial institution.
n Few industriesoffer discountsfor immediate cash payment (see Dun and Bradstreet (1970)), Most trade
credit is advanced for a specific period of time, For example, payment may be due ten days after the goods
are delivered. Other trade credit is offered with a discount if the bill is paid prior to the due date. In either
case, the implicit cost of the loan till the discount or due date is effectively zero.
Z In general, fms do not borrow from their employees. An interesting historical exception can be found
in Rogers (1994).
16From earlier work (PetersenandRajan (1994)), we know that relationships with financial institutions
appear to increase the availability of fmnce from financial institutions to the fm. We use the length of the
longestrelationshipwitha fmncial institution to measure how much information, possibly private, the lender
has accumulated about the firm. It is also a measure of the fm’s reputation in debt markets (Diamond
(1989)). If suppliers rely on signals sent by prior relationships with lenders in their decision to offer credit,
trade creditofferedshouldincreasewith thestrengthof relationshipswith fmncial institutions. If, on the other
hand, suppliersgeneratetheir own information, proxies for relationships with fmncial institutions should not
matter.
A relationship with a financial institution does not increase the trade credit offered to a firm, The
effect of relationship length on the supply of trade credit is economically tiny and statistically insignificant
(p= -.015 and t= -0.2). We also include tie number of banks from which the firm borrows. A firm that
concentrates its borrowing with a single lender will develop a stronger relationship with that lender. The
coefficient on the number of banks from which the fm borrows is also small and statistically insignificant
(regressionestimatesnotreported). Even whether a fwm borrows from a bank at all, a fact easily observable
to the firm’s trade creditors, has no effect on the supply of trade credit.
The interest rate a financial institution charges its customer should include all credit quality relevant
information that the lender can observe and thinks is relevant. Suppliers may look to it as a superior source
of information.As a proxy for this information source, as well as an additional measure of credit quality, we
include the risk premium (the fwm’s interest rate relative to a treasury bond of comparable maturity) a firm
paid on itsmost recent loan. Firms which pay higher risk premiums on their most recent loan do receive less
credit from suppliers.However, the effect is small and not statistically significant (see Table V, column 111).
Finally, we include an indicator for fms that have asked for but have been denied credit by fmncial
institutions in the last year. Firms that have been denied their request for a loan in the previous year are
offered less on account. The coefficient is not statistically significant.24These results appear to rule out the
~ Firms whichreport that theywere denieda loan request in the last year may not be the best or the worst
firms. The best firms are not denied, because they are good credit risks. The lowest quality firms may not
bother to apply for a loan which they do not expect to receive, It is ordy fums of intermediate quality that
apply and are turned down for a loan. If this is correct, the proxy is noisy, which would explain why being
turned down for a loan has a statistically insignificant effect on the amount of trade credit a fwm is offered.
17possibility that suppliers rely on banks to monitor on their behalf.
3. Relation.rhipswith suppliers.
We explore the value to suppliers of investing in future relationships with their customers, by
examining the coefficient on profits in Table V more closely. Recall that suppliers offer more credit to
profitable firms. When we estimate separate coefficients for fms making profits and firms making losses,
we find the coefficient on negative net profits is negative (~= -.551 t= -2.3, regression not reported). So
suppliers seem to offer credit to the most profitable and the most unprofitable fwms. This suggests that they
mighthave some advantagein lending to lower quality credit risks who might otherwise be shut out off from
institutional financing.
Boththe fmcing advantagetheoryandtheprice discriminationtheorysuggest that trade credit should
fall off for the lowest quality credits. Why do suppliers seem eager to lend to the most unprofitable firms,
when financial institutions are not? As argued earlier, one reason may be that a fm which is currently
unprofitable may not remain so in the future. By investing in relationships with currently unprofitable but
growingfirms, a suppliermay capture future profitable business from the f~m.fi To test this idea, we divide
thenetprofit variableintothreecategories:firms with positive profits, firms with negative profits but positive
sales growth, and firms with negative profits and negative sales growth. The results are reported in column
V. The last group are distressed firms, for whom low profits lowers the credit offered by suppliers.2sBy
contrast, growing firms who are currently loosing money get more credit the lower their profits (~= -.844,
t= 3.1). A possibleexplamtionof this isthat, f~st, suppliershave an increasing advantage in lending to poorer
quality credits, and second, they do so ordy if they anticipate that growth in future business will compensate
MBanksin concentratedcapitalmarketsact in a similar way. They extend more credit to young firms than
do banks in more competitivecapital markets. The banks in concentrated capital markets anticipate correctly
thattheywill be able to recoup their investment by charging higher rates when the f~ms expand and mature
(Petersenand Rajan (1995)).If suppliershave more market power over their customers than banks, they may
be able to finance firms which banks can not profitably fmnce.
‘sThe coefficient on net profits for firms with negative profits and negative sales growth is positive, but
not statistically different from zero. Neither is it statistically different from the coefficient on net profits for
firms with positive profits. Pooling distressed firms with profitable firms has no effect on the explanatory
power of the regression.
18them for the risks they are taking.27By lending to these apparently high risk fms, suppliers can invest in the
future viability and profitability of their customers.
Finally, we include an indicator if the fm is located in an MSA (coefficient not reported). These
firms are offered more credit, though the coefficient is not statistically significant.
4. Liquidation costs.
The final source of financing advantage is the greater ability of suppliers (relative to financial
institutions)to liquidate the firm’s assets. Suppliers can repossess and resell goods to other buyers. But once
thecustomerhas transformed its inputs into outputs, they will be more costly for the supplier to sell and thus
its competitive advantage over financial institutions in liquidating these goods is lost. As a proxy for the
supplier’s advantage in liquidating the borrower’s assets we use the fraction of the firm’s inventory that are
finished goods. Since the NSSBF does not provide us with information on the composition of each fum’s
inventory, we use the average finished goods to total inventory ratio for Compustat fmms with the same two
digit SIC code in 1987. The composition of inventory in an industry has a large effect on the credit that
suppliers offer fums in our sample, A fm with only fiished goods inventory, compared to zero finished
goods inventory, will lower its purchases on account by 73 percentage points (t= -4.3).
To summ~ize our ftiings, suppliersdo worry aboutthe ability of the borrower to repay. In general,
a firm with lower credit quality gets less credit. However suppliers appear to support growing, cash-
constrained firms with credit. Not only do the prospects of future profits give them a greater incentive to
fmce their customers, they may also have a financing advantage over financial institutions. Suppliers seem
to use differentcriteriafrom fucial institutionsin assessing whether to offer credit. The availability of trade
credit is not significantly related to the existence (or absence) of lending relationships with financial
institutions. Finally, the ability of suppliers to liquidate collateral seems important. The lower the ratio of
finished goods to inventory, the greater the amount of credit offered. Thus the financing advantage for
n An alternativeexplanationisthat f- withpositivesalesgrowth are more likely in the long run to repay
than firms with negative sales growth. While this may indeed be true for long term loans, trade credit is so
shortterm that the growth in sales should have little impact. The probabilities of default may be lower in the
group with positive sales growth (though one could argue ftrrns in this group are more likely to be cash
constrained).This couldexplainthe highercreditextendedto the group with positive sales growth, but not why
the credit extended increases as firms become more unprofitable.
19suppliers appear to come from their low cost of information acquisition and their ability to more efficiently
liquidate assets.
B. Determinants of who demad trade credit: accountspayable
1. Supply of trade credit.
Havingexaminedthe supplyof trade credit, we now turn to the determinants of a firm’s demand for
trade credit. Oncea firm haspurchaseda good on credit, how long it waits (or can wait) before repaying will
determinethe level of the f~m’s accounts payable. An amlysis of accounts payable can shed additional light
on the financing advantage theory, though it will have no implications for the price discrimination theory.
We explainthe firm’s stock of accounts payable (normalized by assets) using the predicted supply of
trade credit andproxiesfor the fro’s demandfor trade credit. We use the estimates from the previous section
(TableV, column o to calculatea predicted value of the purchases on account to assets ratio. Recall that this
ratio is mismeasured to the extent that costs of goods sold include wages. We, therefore, subtract from the
predicted ratio the firm’s employee to assets ratio times the coefficient estimate of 0.200 for the employees
to assets ratio estimated in Table V. column 1.2*
The firm’s stock of accounts payable increases in our estimate of the purchases that are supplied on
account to the firm (see Table VI, column I). The coefficient estimate of 0.027 is economically large and
statisticallysignificant. This coefficient implies that an increase in the purchases to assets ratio from Oto the
median of 1.38 increases the firm’s stock of accounts payable by about 4 percent of assets,
2. Demnd jorfinding.
Conditionalon the supply of credit, the amount by which firms stretch their accounts payable should
be determined by their demand for credit in general and their demand for trade credit in particular. The
variableswhich proxy for the firm’s credit demand include measures of the fwm’s investment opportunities,
asset maturity, liquidity, as well as access to credit from financial institutions.
u Insteadof including an estimate of the supply of trade credit in this regression, we could have included
the purchases on account variable from Table V and then used instrumental variables to estimate the
coefficients.This is donein columnII of TableVI. In addition to the other variables in the regression (column
I), we used employees per thousand dollars of assets, whether the firm was incorporated, and the percent of
invento~ which is ftished goodsas fitruments. Theseare the variableswhich we used in Table V to estimate
trade credit supply. The coefficient estimates in column I and 11are similar.
20Firms that are growing more quickly presumably have more investment opportunities. A proxy for
this is the change in sales scaled by assets. The underlying relationship between the demand for trade credit
andsalesgrowth isnon-linear.Increases in sales raise the fm’s demand for credit. Each additional dollar of
salesincrease the demand for trade credit by 1.2 cents.29To put this number in perspective, a firm’s cost of
goods sold averages 43 percent of sales in our sample. So fms finance about 3 percent of this with trade
credit. However, tradecredit is shortterm credit. If we recalculate this percent based on monthly sales (rather
thanannual sales) increasing by one dollar, then firms fimnce about 33 percent of their increased purchases
with trade credit. The coefficient on sales declines is negative but small in magnitude (~= -O.004). Firms
whosesalesfallhavehigher accountspayable,but only slightlymore. Combined with the evidence from Table
V, this suggests that suppliers are willing to fmnce high sales growth fums by offering more credit.
In samples of large firms, investment opportunities are ~ically thought to decline in fwm size and
fm age. For smallfums, it is lessclear thatthis is thecme, for certain projects may become viable ordy after
thefirm has acquired adequate assets and experience. Our estimates (Table VI, column I) indicate that firm
sizeand firm age are only weakly positively correlated with the firm’s accounts payable. The strong positive
relationshipapparentinTableII betweenfirm sizeand accounts payable therefore comes mairdy from the fact
thatlarger ~s are offeredmore tradecredit-- presumablybecause they are better credit risks -- not because
they have greater demand to borrow from their suppliers (see Table V, column I and Table VI, column 1),
We also includea crudeproxy for whetherfums needcredit. Firms in the data set report whether they
have applied for a loan or line of credit from a financial institution in the past year. Fourteen percent of the
fms in our samplehave. We fid thatloanapplicationsare uncorrelatedwith demand for trade credit. If there
are non-trivialcostsof applying,thedecisionto apply may depend upon the firm’s expected success in getting
a loan. So a number of firms may need credit but may not apply. This may explain why we do not fmd a
29For twelvepercent of our sample, 1986salesare notreported. We code the change in sales equal to zero
for these firms and include a dummy variable for whether 1986 sales are missing. If these observations are
essentiallynew high growth firms, then we would expect their demand for trade credit to be higher than the
trade credit demand from a firm with zero sales growth. We do not find this, Firms with missing sales have
slightly lower demand for trade credit than a fum which reports no change in sales. The coefficient on this
variable is not statistically significant. Thus coding the f~ms with missing sales as having zero sales growth
is correct on average.
21significant correlation.
It is unlikely that a firm will finance long term projects
maturityof assetsandliabilities, and Diamond (1991) and Hart and
A measure of a firm’s demand for short term fimncing is its short
with trade credit. Most firms match the
Moore (1991) present rationales for this.
term assets.30Firms whose assets consist
mairdy of current assets (excluding cash) demand significantly more trade credit. At the margin, seventeen
percentof the fro’s current assets are financed by trade credit (see Table VI, column I). Interestingly, cash
holdings have no empirical effect (coefficient not reported).3’
In addition to age and size, we also include dummy variables for each of the two digit industries
representedin thedata to proxy for differences in industry investment opportunities in Table VI, column III.
This increases the magnitude and statistical significance of several of the estimate.
3. Credit availabilip.
Having corrected for the availability of trade credit, the firm’s investment opportunities, and the
maturity of the firm’s assets, we now investigate if the firm’s liquidity position and the availability of credit
from fimncial institutionsaffectsthe demandfor trade credit. If it does in a significant way, this would suggest
thattradecreditfinancing is lower in the “pecking order” than intermlly generated cash (Myers, 1984). The
firm’s ability to generate cash internally decreases its demand for trade credit.32Each additioml dollar of
monthly profits lowers the firm’s demand for trade credit by 23 cents (= ,019*12) and the estimate is
significant at the 1% level. The statistically significant and negative coefficient for cashflow in tie demand
me current assets ratio obviously varies dramatically across industries, ranging from a low of about 20
percent of assets in mining (SIC 1000-1499) and transportation and utilities (SIC 4100-4999) to a high of
almost 60 percent in the wholesale trade industry (SIC 5000-5199).
3]Firms withhigh cashholdingsmay have enough cash to not require accounts payable financing, or may
have hoarded cash to repay accounts payable. It is not a priori clear which effect should predominate, The
estimated coefficient on cash to assets is only 0.026 (t= 1.1).
32 Theoretically,casMow rather thanprofitsdividedby assetsis the correct variable. However, the NSSBF
does not report depreciation as a separate expense in the profit and loss statement. We could estimate
depreciationas a fixed fraction of the firm’s assets and add estimated depreciation to operating profits to get
cashflow.However, sincewe thendivideprofits(or casMow) by assets,this would only change the coefficient
estimate but not the explanatory power of the regression or the variable. Alternatively we could estimate
depreciationas a constantpercentage of the firm’s property, plant, and equipment. Using a depreciation rate
of 10percent raises the coefficient on cashflow to assets marginally.
22equation(seeTableVI) andthe statisticallysignificantandpositivecoefficient in the supply equation (see Table
V) addscredenceto our argumentthatthe firm’spurchases on account measures the credit offered to the firm
by its suppliers and that we have therefore distinguished the ‘supply for trade credit’ equation from the
‘demand for trade credit’ equation.
The firm’s demand for trade credit may also depend upon its access to credit from financial
institutions.We fwstexamineseveral explicit measures. Four percent of the firms in our sample report being
turned down for a loan or approved for an amount less than they requested. Since we have also included an
indicator if the firm applied for a loan, we can distinguish f~s that applied and were granted a loan from
fms that applyand get lessthantheydemanded.The latterdemandmore trade credit, although the coefficient
is not precisely estimated. As discussed earlier, this may be a biased measure of rationing because credit-
constrained~s thatdo not expectto receive a loan may choose not to apply at all, making the proxy noisy.
The second explicit measure of rationing we consider is the availability of unused lines of credit.
Ahnost onethird of the fms in our sample have lines of credit which they have not completely drawn down.
We fmdthat fms with largerunusedlinesof creditdemand less trade credit. The coefficient (-0.063) is large
(see Table VI, column IV). While firms appear to finance their short term assets with short term liabilities,
theyappear tomeatinstitutionalfmnce and trade credit as substitutes. Note that by including only the unused
portion of the line of credit, we avoid picking up the accounting identity.
Petersen andRajan (1994)fmd that relationships between fums and financial institutions relax credit
rationing. If trade credit borrowing comes lower down in the pecking order than borrowing from close
fmcial institutions,we shouldfmd that the strength of relationships with institutions is negatively correlated
withdemandfor trade credit. This is exactly what the data show. We use the log of one plus the length of the
fro’s longestrelationshipwith a fmncial lender to measure the strength of the lending relationships. Longer
relationshipswith institutions correlate negatively with a fwm’s demand for trade credit.33An increase in the
length of the maximum relationship from zero to ten years (the minimum to the median), lowers a fwm’s
accountspayables by over three percent of its assets. This result implies that trade credit is relied on mairdy
33 The length of the longest relationship is also correlated with the fum’s age. The correlation coefficient
is 0.55 in our sample, However, the length of the longest relationship is not a proxy for firm age which is
included in the regression.
23by firms thatare constrainedby their institutionallenders. If a fwm can secure enough credit from its financial
institution,itdoes not stretchout itsaccountspayableas long-- suggestingthat borrowing from trade creditors,
at least for longer periods of time, is a more expensive form of credit. Finally, fms demand slightly more
trade creditin MSASwhere instituhomlfinancingis weaker. Coupled with our observation from Table V that
firms in MSAS are offered somewhat more credit, this suggests that trade credit substitutes for institutional
finance in more competitive markets.
4. Price of trade credit.
Thus far, we have argued that suppliers do not vary the price of trade credit much. But does the
demandfor trade creditdependon itsprice?We do not know the specific terms a f~m faces, but we do know
what fraction of its credit purchases are accompanied by early payment discounts. In our sample, tiee
quarters of the frms report receiving early payment discounts on at least some of their credit purchases. The
earlypayment discount should encourage firms to pay early and thus reduce their accounts payable, holding
the supplyof creditconstant.To test the price elasticity of demand we include the percent of credit purchases
offered with early payment discounts. The coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant (see Table
VI, columnV). This is consistentwiththe argumentthat missing early payment discounts is expensive and the
decisionto takeadvantageof earlypaymentdiscountsis drivennotby the implicit cost of this credit but instead
by whether the firm has alternative source of credit. Ordy credit constrained firms take advantage of this
expensive form of credit.
24V. Discussion and Conclusion,
We now attempt to draw reasomble conclusions from all the evidence we have accumulated on the
rationalefor trade credit. In the absence of confiimatory evidence, some of these concksions may better be
termed conjectures, and await future research.
As might be expected, suppliers offer more credit to ftrrns of higher credit quality. But these firms
use less trade credit if they have access to institutional finance. Coupled with the observation that suppliers
provide strongincentivesfor firms not to extend the term of the offered credit by giving substantial discounts
for prompt payment and strict penalties for late payment (see Petersen and Rajan (1994)), this suggests that
trade credit is more expensive than institutioml fimnce, especially if used for medium term financing.
The desireof suppliers to restrict fums to short term financing suggests an advantage in that type of
financing over financial institutions. What is the mture of that advantage? One possibility is that creditors
obtaininformationaboutthe firm routinely, and at low cost, from their transactions with the firm. Of course,
financialinstitutionsalsoproduceprivate information about the fiims to whom they lend (Slovin, Sushka, and
Polonchek (1993)). Suppliers do not, however, appear to rely on information provided by lending
relationships;measures of the strength of institutional relationships or the risk premium on institutioml loans
granted, have littleeffect on how much trade credit a firm is offered. A reasonable conclusion from the data
is that suppliers collect and use different information than funcial institutions. The most valuable aspect of
this information may be how current it is. By monitoring repayment and using discounts as a trip-wire,
suppliers get a quick read on a firm’s financial and economic health (see Smith (1987)).
Suppliers appear to use this informational advantage in lending to firms of currently suspect credit
quality (current losses) but with high potential for future business (high sales growth), as well as fwms
neglectedby fmncial institutions.Whymight supplierscontinueextending credit to these fums when financial
institutions do not? In addition to getting faster information about any deterioration of the firm’s prospects,
suppliers may continue to have a significant hold over the firm -- so long as it continues production. This is
urdike financial institutions whose control may be diminished by bankruptcy filings. Furthermore, suppliers
cantake addedprecautionssuchas makingconsignmentsaleswhen the customer’s failure to avail of discounts
or pay ontime sets off a trip wire. Suppliers are in the best position to liquidate the goods they have sold the
25fm, providedit has not been transformed (and provided they are secured so suppliers can seize the goods).
This may be whywe fmd thatthe supply of trade credit increases in the extent to which inventories consist of
raw materials.
In additionto havinga greater abilityto enforce repayment from risky fums, suppliers may also have
greater incentive to offer credit than do funcial institutions. When suppliers camot discriminate by price,
trade creditmay be necessary to finance sales to those who cannot obtain credit from institutions. A supplier
who cannotprice discriminate has two margins with which to work -- the price of credit and the price of the
good. Thus the supplier’sprofitmargin from a sale embles him to bear a lower profit or a greater loss on the
credit than can a financial institution. We find that trade credit offered by a f~m increases in the size of its
margins on sales. Furthermore, if a firm and its supplier continue to transact in the future, the supplier has
an implicit equity stake in the firm equal to the present value of the margins he makes on current and future
salesof theproductto thefum. This may far exceed the implicit equity stake a financial institution may have
becauseof the potential for future business, and may explain why suspect growing firms tend to be financed
by suppliers.
In summary, we fti some evidence that suppliers may have a financing advantage, especially when
a firm is financial y troubled. Also, we have indirect evidence from the correlation between margins and
receivables that a firm may offer trade credit as a means of price discrimination. A more direct test of the
price discrimination theory would be possible if we knew the set of fmmsto which a supplier sold. If the set
of fnms had uniformly high credit ratings, there would be no need to offer credit. If they had uniformly low
creditratings, the suppliercouldsimplylowertheprice andletfmcial institutions finance. It is only if buyers
come with all manner of credit rating that trade credit becomes a viable instrument of price discrimination.
This test awaits more comprehensive data.
The singlemost importantstepfor future research is to examine the determinants of trade credit over
time. Thiswfllpermit more powefl testsof the financing advantage and transactions costs h~otheses. More
detailed data (for instance on the relationships beween suppliers and customers) will allow researchers to
investigatetheprice discriminationandquali~ guaranteehypothesesmore fully. The role of financially healthy
suppliers in intermediating finance to growing firms as well as the implications for the transmission of
26monetarypolicy deserves further investigation. Finally, we show that firms with sales declines are forced to
extendrelativelymore trade creditwithout getting any more support from suppliers. This points to a potential
costof fmncial distressthat hashitherto not been investigated. Furthermore, it suggests that trade credit may
be a suategic tool for deep pocket fms to increase the minimum scale of staying in the industry. The scope
for research is obvious.
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29Table I: Accounts Payables and Receivables to Sales Ratios
Panel A: Small Firms
Accounts Payable / Sales Accounts Receivable / Sales
Industry Mean Median % Zero Mean Median % Zero
Mining 6.1 4.6 23.1 9.9 6.9 30.8
Construction 5.4 2,5 25.7 10,4 7.8 14.8
Manufacturing 6.5 4.2 11.7 11,8 10.0 9.8
Transportation/Utilities 3.8 1.9 31.5 8.1 6.5 17,6
Wholesale Trade 7.0 3.8 15,6 8.1 7.0 6.2
Retail Trade 3.9 1.7 26.6 3.0 0.4 39.6
Services 2.7 0.0 51.9 8.0 3.5 34.2
Total 4.4 1.8 30.9 7,3 3.8 26.5
ThistableISbasedon tie National Survey of Small Business Finance. Firms in the agricultural (SIC 100-999) and
financial sectors (SIC 6000-6999) were excluded. Ratios are expressed as percents.
Panel B: Large Firms
Accounts Payable / Sales Accounts Receivable / Sales
Industry Mean Median % Zero Mean Median % Zero
Mining 25.2 17.5 0.5 28.7 21.7 2.0
Construction 17.0 8.3 0.0 15.8 16.4 23.7
Manufacturing 9.8 7.4 0.4 19.1 17.0 0.6
Transportation/Utilities 14.3 8.6 1.2 16.2 14.1 2.6
Wholesale Trade 12.5 8.6 2.0 15.5 14.0 0.9
Retail Trade 8.6 6.7 0,8 7.3 2.3 6.2
Services 10.6 6.5 1.1 22.4 19.4 3.7
Total 11.6 7.6 0.7 18.5 16.1 2.3
This rableis based on the Compustatdata base. Firms in the agriculmral (SIC 100-999) and financial sectors (SIC 6000-

























ITable III: Summary Statistics.
Variables Mean Median Standard
deviation
Accounts receivable to sales ratio 0.066 0.039 0.083
Log(Book Value of Assets) 12.18 11.96’ 1.93
Log (1 + Firm Age (in years)) 2.35 2.39 0,88
Maximum available line of credit/ 0.06 0.00 0.09
sales.
Net profit divided by sales. 0.10 0.05 0.23
Percent sales growth (86-87) 0.26 0.07 0.59
if positive, zero otherwise
Percent sales growth (86-87) -0.04 0.00 0.11
if negative, zero otherwise
34Table IV
The Determinants of Accounts Receivable.
The dependent variable is the accounts receivable to sales ratio reported by the fwm. The coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression has a constant
whose coefficient is not reported. Firms in the f~cial industry (SIC 6000-6999) and the service industry
(SIC 7000-8999) are excluded unless otherwise stated.
Independent variable I 11 III IVa Vb
Log(Book Value of Assets)
Log(l + Firm Age)
(in years)
Log(l + Firm Age)z
(in years)
Maximum available line of credit
/sales.
Net profits / sales.
Net profits / sales
if positive, zero otherwise.
Net profits / sales
if negative, zero otherwise.
Percent sales growh (86-87)
if positive, zero otherwise
Percent sales growth (86-87)
if negative, zero otherwise
Gross profit margin / sales
(Gross profit margin / sales)2






































































































35Wholesaler of durable goods (0,1) .001
(.009)
Number of Observations 1805 1805 1805 1805 277
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.144 0.150 0.315 0.154
a402 digit SIC indicators are included in addition to the constant.
b Includes onlywholesalers (SIC codes 5000-5199).
When the distribution ofavariable washigMy skewed for high values, werecoded thehighest percent of
valuestothe 99th~rcentile of the distribution. Similar]y if it was highly skewed for low values, we recoded
the lowestpercent of valuestothe 1stpercentileof thedistribution.These variables include accounts receivable
to sales, net profits to sales, sales growth, and gross profit margin to sales.
]Coefficient significantly different from zero at the one percent level.
5Coefficient significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
10Coefficient significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.
36Table V
Trade Credit Supply: Purchases Made on Credit over Assets
The dependentvariableisthe fum’s purchaseson accountdividedby assets. Purchases on account is calculated
as the percent of purchases made on account times the fm’s costs of goods sold. The coefficients are
estimatedusing ordinaryleastsquares. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes one digit
SIC industrydummy variables(unlessotherwisespecified)and a constant whose coefficients are not reported.
Firms in the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999) and service industry (SIC 7000-8999).
Independent variable Ib 11’ III IV v
Prnxy for -
Employees / assets ($10,000)
cre~
Log(book value of assets)
Net profits / assets
Log( 1+ firm age )
Log{ 1+ firm age )2
Firm is incorporated
Longest relationship with lender
(in years)
Risk premium on most recent loan
(premium over treasuries)
Firm denied request for loan
in the last year (O,1)
Net profits / assets
(if profits > O)
Net profits / assets
(if profits <O& sales growth > O)
Net profits / assets
(if profits <O& sales growth <O)






















































































Number of observations 1644 1706 758 1644 1644
R2 12.0 21.2 15.4 12.0 13.0
37aIndustry variables are calculated using 1987 Compustat data. Each variable was calculated for firms in a 2
digit SIC code industry. These average industry values were then matched to the f~ms in the NSSBF.
b Due to low asset values 23 firms had extremely high ratios for purchase on account to assets, These
observationswere recodedto the 99thpercentile of the distribution. We tested this approach by estimating the
regressionusing a tobit with an upper limit of the 99th percentile of the purchase on account regression. The
empiricalresultsare qualitatively similar. Low asset values also caused some of the independent variables to
be skewed. When the distribution of a variable was highly skewed, we recoded the upper percent of values
to the 99th percentile of the distribution. These variables include operating profits to assets, employees to
assets, and number of trade creditors to assets.
cThis regression includes 40 industry dummies -- one for each 2 digit SIC code in our data set. The percent
of inventory which is ftished goods is based on industry averages and must therefore be dropped from this
specification.
1Coefficient significantly different from zero at the one percent level.
5Coefficient significantly different from zero at the five percent level,
10Coefficient significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.
38Table VI
Trade Credit Demand: Accounts Payable over Assets
The dependent variable is the accounts payable to asset ratio reported by the firm. The coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes five
industrydummyvariables and a constant whose coefficients are not reported. Firms in the financial industry
(SIC 6000-6999) and service industry (SIC 7000-8999).
Independent variable I IIb 111’ IV v
vrlf~
Predicted supply of trade credit
t assets’
A sales (86-87) / assets
if positive, zero otherwise
A sales (86-87) / assets
if negative, zero otherwise
1986 sales missing (O,1)
Log(book value of assets)
Log( 1+ firm age )
Log( 1+firm age )2
Current assets excluding cash / assets
Firm applied for loan during
previous year (O,1)
Net Profits / assets
Available line of credit / assets
Firm denied credit request during
previous year (O,1)
Log(1+ Longest relationship
with lender) (in years)
Firm is located in an MSA
Percent of credit purchases offered





































































































































39Early payment discounts missing -.0351
(.010)
Number of observations 1968 1588 1968 1968 1968
~z 14.9 0.2 17.6 15.3 15.6
Low assetvaluesalso caused some of the independent variables to be skewed. When the distribution
of a variable was highly skewed, we recoded the upper percent of values to the 99th percentile of the
distribution. These variables include purchase on account to assets, operating profits to assets, employees to
assets, and number of trade creditors to assets.
aPredictedtrade credit supplyisthe estimatedvalueofpurchase on account over assets from Table V, column
I. We adjustedour esdrnateof purchases on account by subtracting off 0.200 (the coefficient on employment
over assets) times the value of employment over assets for each observation. This removed the
mismeasurement in purchases on account caused by wages being included in cost of goods sold, but not
purchases on account.
bThis regressionwas estimatedwith insnurnentalvariables.In addition to the other variables in the regression,
we used employees per thousand dollars of assets, whetier the fum was incorporated, and the percent of
inventorywhichis finishedgoodsas instruments.Theseare the variableswhich we used in Table V to estimate
trade credit supply.
cThis regression includes 36 industry dummies -- one for each 2 digit SIC code in our data set.
1Coefficient significantly different from zero at the one percent level.
5Coefficient significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
10Coefficient significantly different from zero at the ten percent level,













The amount of trade credit extended between the fm and its suppliers will appear as the accounts
payable on the balance sheet of the fwm. The amount of trade credit extended behveen the fum and its
customers will appear as accounts receivable on the balance sheet of the firm.
41